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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
In this appeal, we are asked to determine what factors 
a district court may consider when sentencing a defendant 
below a statutory minimum term of imprisonment in order to 
take his assistance to the government into account pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  We hold that a district court cannot use 
factors unrelated to a defendant‟s substantial assistance to the 
government in order to reduce a sentence below the minimum 
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called for under statute.  We will therefore vacate the 
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. 
I. Background 
 In March 2007, police officers went to the residence of 
appellee Thomas David Winebarger following complaints 
they had received of gunshots heard in the area.  Winebarger 
admitted to the officers that he had fired a shot at a tree on his 
property using a rifle he owned.  He claimed he used the gun 
for hunting.  When authorities learned that Winebarger was a 
convicted felon, he was charged with one count of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g).  Winebarger agreed to plead guilty and to cooperate 
with the government.  He formally entered a plea of guilty on 
December 22, 2009. 
Before sentencing, the U.S. Probation Office prepared 
a pre-sentence investigation report and determined that 
Winebarger qualified as a career offender under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  As a result, his 
total offense level was calculated as 30 and his criminal 
history category as IV, yielding an advisory guidelines range 
of 135 to 168 months.  However, Winebarger‟s status as a 
career offender subjected him to a mandatory minimum 
sentence of 180 months.
1
  Winebarger objected to his 
classification as a career offender, claiming that one of the 
predicate offenses that the Probation Office considered in 
                                              
1
 Absent the career offender designation, Winebarger‟s 
offense level would have been 10, and his criminal history 
category would have been II, yielding an advisory guidelines 
range of 8 to 14 months‟ imprisonment.   
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determining that he is an armed career felon—a 1980 
Pennsylvania simple assault conviction—was not a predicate 
violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  The District Court 
held a hearing on this issue on October 6, 2010, and took the 
matter under advisement.   
 At Winebarger‟s sentencing, the District Court 
announced, without explanation, that it was overruling 
Winebarger‟s objection and adopting the Probation Office‟s 
view that Winebarger qualified as a career offender.  
However, the Court determined that it was not bound by the 
15-year mandatory minimum sentence because the 
government had filed, under seal, a motion requesting a 
downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  That 
provision reads: 
Limited authority to impose a sentence below 
a statutory minimum. — Upon motion of the 
Government, the court shall have the authority 
to impose a sentence below a level established 
by statute as a minimum sentence so as to 
reflect a defendant‟s substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense.  Such 
sentence shall be imposed in accordance with 
the guidelines and policy statements issued by 
the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 
994 of title 28, United States Code.   
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  Winebarger had provided information 
regarding the manufacture and sale of methamphetamine in 
the Bradford County area of Pennsylvania.  The government 
also noted the limitations of Winebarger‟s assistance: he 
declined requests to engage in undercover investigations or 
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other more substantial cooperation.  In addition, the 
government commented that Winebarger provided no live 
testimony and that the information he offered had yielded no 
new investigations or arrests. 
 The District Court granted the government‟s § 3553(e) 
motion.  Acknowledging our decision in United States v. 
Torres, 251 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2001), the Court briefly 
discussed how the factors listed in section 5K1.1 of the 
sentencing guidelines applied in Winebarger‟s case.  Section 
5K1.1 reads: 
Upon motion of the government stating that the 
defendant has provided substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense, the court 
may depart from the guidelines.  
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be 
determined by the court for reasons stated that 
may include, but are not limited to, 
consideration of the following:  
(1) the court‟s evaluation of the significance 
and usefulness of the defendant‟s 
assistance, taking into consideration the 
government‟s evaluation of the 
assistance rendered;  
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and 
reliability of any information or 
testimony provided by the defendant;  
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant‟s 
assistance;  
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk 
of injury to the defendant or his family 
resulting from his assistance;   
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(5) the timeliness of the defendant‟s 
assistance. 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.  The District Court noted that Winebarger 
gave the government helpful information, though it led to no 
extensive investigation.  The Court also noted that the 
government said Winebarger‟s help was reliable and timely, 
and that Winebarger‟s cooperation with the government did 
not pose a great risk of injury to him.   
The District Court then went on to note other factors that 
influenced it in sentencing Winebarger:  
 “most of the [defendant‟s] criminal conduct” occurred 
almost thirty years ago (App. 37-38); 
 He has “many brothers and sisters and children, but 
[he is] not close to any of them” (App. 39-40); 
 He is a lifelong resident of Bradford county;  
 He lives in a trailer with no electricity, running water, 
telephone or sewer line; 
 He receives total disability payments from Social 
Security; 
 He has high blood pressure, congestive heart failure, 
upper spine problems, and leukemia;  
 “Most importantly,” imprisoning him “would cost the 
taxpayers a small fortune, because [he is] a sick person 
and would require care, even in prison” (App. 41); 
 He has few educational or vocational skills; 
 His liabilities exceed his assets; 
 It is “very questionable” whether he used the gun for 
which he was charged “in any inappropriate or illegal 
way” (App. 42). 
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The Court then imposed a prison sentence of time-served (one 
month and three days) and five years of supervised release. 
 The government then made a statement on the record 
that it believed it was not given an opportunity to give a 
recommendation with regard to sentencing, but that if it had, 
it would have recommended a sentence at the bottom of the 
guidelines range: 135-168 months.  The government 
explained that this recommendation was based on 
Winebarger‟s prior record, including crimes committed 
within the last ten years. 
 According to the government, it realized shortly after 
Winebarger‟s sentencing that the final page of its section 
3553(e) motion—in which the government recommended a 
sentence below the 180-month mandatory minimum but 
within the 135-168 month guidelines range—was 
inadvertently not filed with the Court.  The government 
therefore filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 to 
correct the sentence, arguing that the sentence reflected a 
misunderstanding as to its recommendation.  The District 
Court denied that motion and this appeal followed.
2
 
II. Discussion 
A. 
                                              
2
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742.  We review a district court‟s sentence for 
procedural and substantive reasonableness, applying an abuse 
of discretion standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 
567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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 The government argues that the sentence ordered by 
the District Court was procedurally unreasonable in that it 
reduced Winebarger‟s sentence below the mandatory 
minimum sentence of imprisonment based on factors 
unrelated to Winebarger‟s cooperation with the government.  
We agree. 
 When Congress establishes a minimum sentence for a 
particular crime, district courts are required to sentence 
defendants guilty of that crime to a term of imprisonment no 
less than the Congressionally prescribed minimum, unless an 
explicit exception to the minimum sentence applies.  See 
United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004); 
see also United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 673 (7th Cir. 
2009).  Section 3553(e) provides one such limited exception 
to the general rule.  Kellum, 356 F.3d at 289 (describing §§ 
3553(e) and (f) as “narrow exceptions”); Johnson, 580 F.3d at 
673 (“[W]ithout the statutory mandate in § 3553(e), the 
district court would have no authority whatsoever to depart 
below the statutory minimum in [defendant‟s] case.”).  That 
the exception is limited is clear from the language of § 
3553(e), entitled “Limited authority to impose a sentence 
below a statutory minimum,” which states in part that “[u]pon 
motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority 
to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a 
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant‟s substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) 
(emphasis added).
3
  It is of paramount importance here that 
                                              
3
 We recognize that the title of § 3553(e) is not controlling or 
dispositive, but it at least reinforces our view that this 
statutory provision provides a limited exception to a statutory 
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Congress used the language “so as to reflect a defendant‟s 
substantial assistance.”  Id.  Presumably, Congress could have 
written the first sentence of § 3553(e) to read, “Upon motion 
of the Government indicating that a defendant has given 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense, the court shall 
have the authority to impose a sentence below a level 
established by statute as a minimum sentence.”  This, 
however, was not the language Congress chose.  Congress‟s 
chosen language explicitly indicates that the reduction below 
the statutory minimum is to “reflect” a defendant‟s assistance 
to the government in investigating and prosecuting other 
offenders.  This language does not give a court carte blanche 
to sentence a defendant below a statutory minimum sentence 
based on non-assistance-related factors once it is established 
that the defendant provided assistance to the government.  See 
United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 
2007) (“If a district court imposes a sentence below the 
statutory minimum in part so as to reflect the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, see § 3553(a)(1), then the 
court exceeds the limited authority granted by § 3553(e).”).  It 
limits the district court to considering factors that “reflect” the 
defendant‟s assistance to law enforcement authorities. 
                                                                                                     
minimum sentence.  See United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 
236, 246 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that statutory title reinforces 
interpretation of text and structure of statute); United States v. 
Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007).  But see 
United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 
2008) (declining to rely on statutory title in holding that a § 
3553(e) reduction cannot be based on non-assistance-related 
factors).    
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 Further evidence of the limited authority that § 3553(e) 
grants to district courts is found by comparing that 
provision‟s language to the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), the 
so-called sentencing “safety valve,” which states that, if 
certain conditions are met, “the court shall impose a sentence 
pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States 
Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without 
regard to any statutory minimum sentence.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(f) (emphasis added).
4
  As the First Circuit Court of 
                                              
4
 That provision, in its entirety, reads: 
Limitation on applicability of statutory 
minimums in certain cases. —  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in 
the case of an offense under section 401, 404, or 
406 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
U.S.C. 841, 844, 846) or section 1010 or 1013 
of the Controlled Substances Import and Export 
Act (21 U.S.C. 960, 963), the court shall impose 
a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated 
by the United States Sentencing Commission 
under section 994 of title 28 without regard to 
any statutory minimum sentence, if the court 
finds at sentencing, after the Government has 
been afforded the opportunity to make a 
recommendation, that-- 
 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 
criminal history point, as determined under the 
sentencing guidelines;  
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Appeals has noted, “section 3553(f) demonstrates Congress‟s 
                                                                                                     
(2) the defendant did not use violence or 
credible threats of violence or possess a firearm 
or other dangerous weapon (or induce another 
participant to do so) in connection with the 
offense;  
 
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious 
bodily injury to any person;  
 
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, 
manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, 
as determined under the sentencing guidelines 
and was not engaged in a continuing criminal 
enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the 
Controlled Substances Act; and  
 
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing 
hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided to 
the Government all information and evidence 
the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of 
conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the 
fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful 
other information to provide or that the 
Government is already aware of the information 
shall not preclude a determination by the court 
that the defendant has complied with this 
requirement. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).   
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ability to deploy unambiguous statutory language when it 
intends to authorize sentencing judges to ignore the 
limitations imposed by statutory minimum sentences and treat 
a „mandatory minimum‟ case like any other.”  United States 
v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002).
5
  Upon a finding 
that the “safety valve” factors are met, a district court is 
authorized by Congress to sentence the defendant “pursuant 
to [the sentencing guidelines] without regard to any statutory 
minimum sentence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).  This sweeping 
“without regard” language stands in marked contrast to the 
“so as to reflect” language of § 3553(e), which is more 
circumscribed.  See Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 59.  While § 3553(f) 
instructs district courts to disregard a statutory minimum in 
appropriate circumstances, § 3553(e) retains the statutory 
minimum as a reference point and explicitly notes the factor 
that such a divergence from the reference point should reflect.  
See id.; United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 
2008).     
 Our interpretation of section 3553(e) is buttressed by 
section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
6
  
                                              
5
 It is worth noting that subsections (e) and (f) were added to 
section 3553 by different Congresses.  Compare Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1007(a), 100 Stat. 
3207 (adding subsection (e) to 18 U.S.C. § 3553), with 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001(a), 108 Stat. 1796 (adding 
subsection (f) to 18 U.S.C. § 3553). 
6
 Section 5K1.1 is a Sentencing Commission policy statement 
that, by its own terms, relates to departures from a sentencing 
guidelines range, but the Supreme Court has recognized its 
applicability to motions requesting a departure below a 
13 
 
That subsection advises that a district court, when 
determining the extent to which a defendant‟s sentence 
should be reduced based on his substantial assistance to law 
enforcement authorities, should consider: 
(1) the court‟s evaluation of the significance 
and usefulness of the defendant‟s 
assistance, taking into consideration the 
government‟s evaluation of the 
assistance rendered;  
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and 
reliability of any information or 
testimony provided by the defendant;  
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant‟s 
assistance;  
                                                                                                     
statutory minimum.  Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 
129 (1996) (“Section 5K1.1(a) may guide the district court 
when it selects a sentence below the statutory minimum.”); 
see also id. at 132 (Souter, J., concurring) (“[T]he Application 
Notes indicate that § 5K1.1 applies to motions under § 
3553(e)); Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 57 n.1 (discussing § 3553(e) and 
noting that “USSG § 5K1.1 is the principal guideline adopted 
by the Sentencing Commission to aid district courts in 
fashioning substantial assistance departures”); United States 
v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing § 
3553(e) and § 5K1.1 as being governed by similar language).  
The District Court here recognized the applicability of § 
5K1.1 to a § 3553(e) motion, invoking our decision in United 
States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2001), and discussing 
the enumerated § 5K1.1 factors, even though the only motion 
filed was pursuant to § 3553(e).   
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(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk 
of injury to the defendant or his family 
resulting from his assistance;   
(5) the timeliness of the defendant‟s 
assistance. 
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a).  Although the Sentencing Commission 
noted that this list is not exhaustive, each of the factors relates 
to the defendant‟s assistance and none relates to the 
defendant‟s personal characteristics, his background, or the 
nature of his offense.  United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 
429 (3d Cir. 1997).  Although the Commission did not 
purport to give a complete list of factors relevant to 
determining the appropriate sentence reduction for a 
defendant who has given substantial assistance to law 
enforcement authorities, the interpretive maxim of ejusdem 
generis makes clear that unlisted factors must bear some 
relationship to the defendant‟s assistance.  United States v. 
Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other 
grounds by United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 
1994).   
Winebarger urges that our opinion in Casiano dictates 
that the sentencing court may consider factors other than a 
defendant‟s substantial assistance to the government when 
imposing a sentence below a statutory minimum.  In Casiano, 
we held that a district court may consider factors unrelated to 
the defendant‟s cooperation with the government as a basis 
for choosing to limit the extent of a departure pursuant to § 
5K1.1.  113 F.3d at 430.  There, the district court departed 
from a guidelines sentence based on the defendant‟s 
cooperation with the government, but stated that it would 
have departed even further had it considered only the factors 
articulated in section 5K1.1.  Id. at 428.  The district court 
15 
 
stated that the extreme seriousness of the crime and the 
impact on the victim counseled against departing too far from 
the guidelines range.  Id.  We affirmed the judgment of 
sentence, saying that the nature and circumstances of the 
offense are permissible reasons for a district court to limit the 
extent of a § 5K1.1 departure.  Id. at 429-31. 
 Viewed in isolation, our holding in Casiano might be 
read to support the proposition that district courts may 
consider non-assistance-related factors during sentencing 
when the government has filed a motion averring that the 
defendant provided it substantial assistance.  However, 
neither the language nor the logic of Casiano supports such a 
broad rule. 
Although we held that a court may consider factors 
unrelated to a defendant‟s assistance to the government in 
deciding to limit a departure under § 5K1.1, we engaged in an 
extensive discussion that presaged our holding today.  We 
noted that “[t]he limitation of the grounds for departures 
under § 5K1.1 to factors relating to the defendant‟s 
substantial assistance to the authorities finds support in the 
language of the guideline and its commentary.”  Id. at 430.  In 
addition, we noted that Section 5K1.1 is entitled “Substantial 
Assistance to Authorities,” and that the background 
commentary states that “[l]atitude is . . . afforded the 
sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based upon variable 
relevant factors, including those listed above.”  Id. (quoting 
U.S.S.G § 5K1.1 & background commentary (1995)).  We 
also cited with approval cases from other courts of appeals 
holding that only factors relating to a defendant‟s cooperation 
may be used as the basis for granting a departure under § 
5K1.1 or § 3553(e).  Id. at 429 (acknowledging a “growing 
body of precedent that holds that only factors relating to a 
16 
 
defendant‟s cooperation may be used as the basis of a 
departure under § 5K1” and citing a “similar holding” made 
in the context of § 3553(e)).  We pointed out that the bases 
for departures listed in § 5K1.1, although not meant to be 
exhaustive, are instructive as to the district court‟s discretion 
once it has granted a § 5K1.1 motion.  All the enumerated 
factors in §5K1.1 “concern the degree, efficacy, timeliness, 
and circumstances of a defendant‟s cooperation.”  Id.  
Furthermore, we stated that “had the district court decided to 
depart downward on a § 5K1.1 motion because it determined 
that the crime was not serious or the victim was only injured 
insignificantly, it would have been error.”  Id. at 430.   
 Accordingly, we reasoned that the outer limit of the 
permissible departure is set by considering the nature and 
extent of the assistance rendered.  However, we rejected 
Casiano‟s argument that, because courts have held that factors 
wholly unrelated to substantial assistance are not to be 
considered when determining the scope of a permissible 
departure from the guideline sentencing range pursuant to § 
5K1.1, factors unrelated to substantial assistance should not 
be considered when a court chooses to limit the extent of the 
departure.  Notwithstanding “the facial appeal of symmetry” 
of this argument, we opined that “it was not inconsistent for 
the Sentencing Commission to have circumscribed the district 
court‟s discretion for departures for substantial assistance in 
only one direction, i.e., when a district court does, in fact, 
depart.”  Id.  Thus, Casiano permits a district court to 
consider non-assistance-related factors in determining 
whether to limit or withhold an assistance-related sentencing 
departure; it does not throw the door open for district courts 
to consider those factors in order to extend or increase a 
17 
 
departure beyond what a defendant‟s cooperation with the 
government warrants.   
We note that every circuit court of appeals to address 
the issue we face today has held that a court may not use 
factors unrelated to a defendant‟s assistance to the 
government in reducing the defendant‟s sentence below the 
statutory minimum.  See Johnson, 580 F.3d at 673; United 
States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir 2009); United 
States v. Burns, 577 F.3d 887, 894 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc); 
United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 234 n.2 (4th Cir. 2009); 
A.B., 529 F.3d at 1280-83; United States v. Richardson, 521 
F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Mangaroo, 504 
F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2007); Williams, 474 F.3d at 
1132; United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Bullard, 390 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 
2004); Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 56-62.  Today, we join our sister 
circuit courts of appeals in so holding. 
B. 
 We cannot leave this discussion without commenting 
on the meaning of the second sentence of § 3553(e), which 
reads as follows: “Such sentence shall be imposed in 
accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued 
by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 
28, United States Code.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).  It has been 
argued before other courts that the second statutory sentence 
indicates that Congress did not intend to limit district courts 
to consideration of a defendant‟s assistance to the government 
in determining how far below a statutory minimum term of 
imprisonment to sentence a defendant for whom a § 3553(e) 
18 
 
motion was filed.
7
  See Johnson, 580 F.3d at 673; Ahlers, 305 
F.3d at 60-61; United States v. Calle, 796 F. Supp. 853 (D. 
Md. 1992).  According to this argument, once a district court 
approves a § 3553(e) motion, it should employ the same 
sentencing methodology it would use if the defendant had 
never been subject to a mandatory minimum sentence—
considering the sentencing guidelines and the full panoply of 
factors that can influence a sentence thereunder. 
We cannot accept this reasoning given the Supreme 
Court‟s comment on the effect of this sentence in Melendez v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 120, 128-30 (1996).  There, the 
Supreme Court agreed with the government that the second 
sentence of § 3553(e), along with 28 U.S.C. § 994(n),
8
 
“merely charge the [Sentencing] Commission with 
constraining the district court‟s discretion in choosing a 
specific sentence after the Government moves for a departure 
below the statutory minimum.”  Id. at 129.  Thus, the second 
sentence of § 3553(e) is designed to limit the district court‟s 
discretion when sentencing a defendant below a mandatory 
                                              
7
 The parties did not address this specific issue in their briefs, 
but we believe a thorough analysis of § 3553(e) dictates 
consideration of the entire statutory provision. 
8
 “The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the 
general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than 
would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is 
lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, 
to take into account a defendant‟s substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(n). 
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minimum, not to expand its authority.  See United States v. 
Melendez, 55 F.3d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1995) (“As the final 
sentence of § 3553(e) reflects, Congress contemplated that the 
limited downward departure authority there bestowed on a 
sentencing court would be exercised in the context of, and in 
a manner consistent with, a system of Guidelines sentencing 
that was being constructed at the time of the passage of § 
3553(e).”);  United States v. Wills, 35 F.3d 1192, 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (interpreting the 
second sentence of § 3553(e) to mean that “the prosecutor‟s 
authorization to impose a sentence below the statutory 
minimum does not permit the judge to throw out the 
guidelines and impose any term that strikes his fancy”).  The 
provisions of § 5K1.1, for example, would therefore be 
relevant in arriving at the reduced sentence. 
We recognize that our decision restricts the authority 
district court judges have to show clemency to defendants that 
they believe have been unjustly swept up in the dragnet of a 
statute calling for a mandatory minimum sentence.  We also 
have little doubt that the District Court here was motivated by 
a sincere belief that the statutory minimum sentence was a 
disproportionately harsh punishment for Winebarger.  
However, this concern is appropriately directed to Congress, 
rather than the courts. 
C. 
 We hold that the limited statutory authority granted by 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not authorize a district court to 
reduce a sentence below a statutory minimum based on 
considerations unrelated to that defendant‟s substantial 
assistance to law enforcement authorities.  The appropriate 
procedure in a case such as this is for the court to start with 
20 
 
the mandatory minimum sentence as a baseline and then, after 
granting the § 3553(e) motion, to determine the extent to 
which the defendant‟s cooperation warranted a divergence 
from that baseline.  Section 5K1.1 sets out an instructive, 
though not exhaustive, list of factors a sentencing court 
should examine when assessing that assistance and 
determining how far below a statutory minimum it will 
sentence a defendant pursuant to § 3553(e).  See Torres, 251 
F.3d at 147 (holding that a court must examine section 
5K1.1‟s enumerated factors when considering a departure 
under section 5K1.1).  The extent of the departure can be 
tempered downward (but not upward) pursuant to Casiano.  
Here, because the District Court reduced Winebarger‟s 
sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect factors that 
did not relate to Winebarger‟s assistance to law enforcement 
authorities, we will vacate the judgment of sentence and 
remand for resentencing.
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 Because we decide that the District Court abused its 
discretion by considering factors unrelated to Winebarger‟s 
assistance to authorities in reducing his sentence below the 
statutory minimum, we need not reach the government‟s other 
arguments related to the supposed procedural and substantive 
unreasonableness of Winebarger‟s sentence. 
